ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of identifying a small set of privacy profiles as a way of helping users manage their mobile app privacy preferences. Our analysis does not limit itself to looking at permissions people feel comfortable granting to an app. Instead it relies on static code analysis to determine the purpose for which an app requests each of its permissions, distinguishing for instance between apps relying on particular permissions to deliver their core functionality and apps requesting these permissions to share information with advertising networks or social networks. Using privacy preferences that reflect people’s comfort with the purpose for which different apps request their permissions, we use clustering techniques to identify privacy profiles. A major contribution of this work is to show that, while people’s mobile app privacy preferences are diverse, it is possible to identify a small number of privacy profiles that collectively do a good job at capturing these diverse preferences.

1. INTRODUCTION
As of December 2013, the Google Play Store offered more than 1,130,000 apps; the Apple App store offered more than 1,000,000 apps. Each store has reported more than 50 billion downloads since its launch [1, 2]. The growth in the number mobile apps has in part been fueled by the increasing number APIs made available to developers, including a number of APIs to access sensitive information such as a user’s current location or call logs. While these new APIs open the door to exciting new applications, they also give rise to new types of security and privacy risks. Malware is an obvious problem [3, 4]; another danger is that users are often unaware of how much information these apps access and for what purpose.

Early studies in this area have shown that privacy interfaces, whether for iOS or for Android, did not provide users with adequate information or control [5-7]. This was quickly followed by research exploring solutions that offered users finer grain control over the use of these APIs [8-10]. Perhaps because of this research, iOS and Android have now started to offer their users somewhat finer control over mobile app permissions, enabling them for instance to toggle permissions on and off on an app-by-app basis (e.g. iOS5 and above, and also App Ops in Android 4.3). However, with users having an average of over 40 apps on their smartphone [11] and each app requiring an average of a little over 3 permissions [12], systematically configuring all these settings places an unrealistically high burden on users.

This paper investigates the feasibility of organizing end-users into a small set of clusters and of identifying default privacy profiles for each such cluster as a way of both simplifying and enhancing mobile app privacy. We use data obtained through static code analysis and crowdsourcing, and analyze it using machine learning techniques to highlight the limitations of today’s interfaces as well as opportunities for significantly improving them. Specifically, our results were obtained by collecting 21,657 preference ratings from 725 users on 837 free Android apps. These preference ratings were collected on over 1200 app-permission-purpose triples. Each such preference rating captures a user’s willingness to grant a given permission to a given app for a particular purpose. Identification of the purpose(s) associated with a given app’s permission was inferred using static code analysis, while distinguishing between different types of 3rd-party libraries responsible for requesting access to a given permission. For example, if location data is used by an app only because of an ad library bundled with the app, we can infer that location is used for advertising purposes.

Our analysis indicates that a user’s willingness to grant a given permission to a given mobile app is strongly influenced by the purpose associated with such a permission. For instance a user’s willingness to grant access to his or her location will vary based on whether the request is required to support the app’s core functionality or whether it is to share this information with an advertising network or an analytics company. Our analysis further shows that, as in many other privacy domains, people’s mobile app privacy preferences are diverse and cannot adequately be captured by one-size-fits-all default settings. Yet, we show that it is possible to cluster users into a small number of privacy profiles, which collectively go a long way in capturing the diverse preferences of the entire population. This in turn offers the prospect of empowering users to better control their mobile app permissions without requiring them to tediously review each and every app-purpose-permission for the apps on their smartphones. Beyond just mobile apps, these results open the door to privacy interfaces that could help reconcile tensions between privacy and user burden in a variety of domains, in which explosion in functionality and usage scenarios are stretching demands on users.

The contribution of this research is threefold. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of mobile app permissions that is not limited to the types of sensitive resources an app requests (e.g. location, contact lists, account information) but also includes the “purpose” associated with these requests – with purpose identified through static analysis of third party libraries and their API calls. Second, we describe the results of a larger-scale version of the crowdsourcing methodology originally introduced by Lin et al. [13], collecting over 21,000 privacy preferences associated with different permissions and purposes. This allows us to quantitatively link users’ mobile app preferences to different
types of app behaviors that involve sensitive resource usage. Third, we present a clustering analysis of the privacy preferences of 725 smartphone users, and show that, while these preferences are diverse, a relatively small number of privacy profiles can go a long way in simplifying the number of decisions users have to make. This last contribution offers the promise of alleviating user burden and ultimately increasing their control over their information.

2. RELATED WORK
A great deal of past work analyzing smartphone apps has focused on developing useful techniques and tools to detect and manage leakage of sensitive personal information [8-10, 14-26] or studying how users react to these usages [6, 13, 27, 28]. In this section, we summarize the relevant mobile privacy literature, which we organize around three themes.

2.1 Finer Grain Privacy Controls
In Android, apps can only access sensitive resources if they declare permission requests in manifest files\(^1\) and obtain authorization from users to access these permissions at download time. Several studies have examined usability issues related to the permission interface displayed to users as they download Android apps [5-7]. The studies have shown that Android permission screens generally lack adequate information, with most users struggling to understand key terms and the implications associated with the permissions they are requested to grant.

Android 4.3 saw the introduction of a hidden permission manager referred to as a “App Ops” that allows users to review and manipulate settings associated with the permissions of the apps they have downloaded on their smartphones [29, 30]. This feature was later removed in Android 4.4 presumably due to usability problems – namely the unrealistically large number of permission decisions already mentioned in Section 1. Similar fine grain control over permissions has also been offered by third party privacy manager apps, such as LBE privacy guard [31], though it is only available on rooted Android devices. Similar settings are also available in iOS (iOS 5 and above), where users have the ability to turn on and off access to sensitive data or functionality (such as location, contacts, calendars, photos, etc) on an app-by-app basis. ProtectMyPrivacy [32] offers similar settings to jailbroken iPhone users and also provides recommendations based on majority voting (effectively looking for popular one-size-fits-all settings, when such settings can be identified).

A number of research prototypes have also offered used fine grain controls over the permissions [8, 10, 32-35]. MockDroid [8] and TISSA [10] also allow users to object fake information in response to API calls made by apps. AppFence [9], a follow-up to TaintDroid [17], also allows users to specify resources, which should only be used locally. Apex proposed by Nauman et al. [34] provides fine-grained control over resource usage based on context and runtime constraints.

These proposed privacy extensions aim to provide users with finer control over the data accessed by their apps. However, these extensions also assume that users can correctly configure all the resulting settings. We argue that asking users to specify such a large number of privacy preferences is unrealistic. In addition, we show that controlling permissions on an app-by-app basis without taking into account the purpose of these permissions does not enable one to capture important differences in people’s mobile app privacy preferences. The present paper complements prior work in this area by identifying a small number of manageable privacy profiles that takes into account purpose and offers the promise of empowering users to manage their mobile app privacy without imposing an undue burden on them.

2.2 Modeling People’s Mobile App Privacy Preferences
A second line of research has focused on studying users’ mobile app privacy concerns and preferences. For example, Felt et al. [28], Chin et al. [27], and Egelman et al [36] conducted surveys and interviews to understand mobile users’ mobile privacy concerns as well as their over understanding of the choices they are expected to make.

Several efforts have researched interfaces intended to improve the way in which users are informed about mobile app data collection and usage practices. Kelley et al. evaluated the benefits of including privacy facts in an app’s description in the app store, effectively enabling users to take into account privacy considerations prior to download time [7]. Choe et al. showed that a framing effect can be exploited to nudge people away from privacy invasive apps [37]. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) released guidelines for a short-form mobile app privacy notice in July 2013, aiming to provide app users with clear information about how their personal data are collected, used and shared by apps [38, 39]. Work by Balebako et al. [40], suggests that more work may be required for these interfaces to become truly effective. More generally, Felt et al. discussed the strengths and weaknesses of several permission-granting mechanisms and provided guidelines for using each mechanism [41].

Studies have also shown that users are often surprised when they find out about the ways in which information collected by their apps is being used [13, 42, 43], e.g. what type of data is requested, how often, and for what purpose. In [13], we used crowdsourcing to identify app-permission-purpose triples that were inconsistent with what users expected different apps to collect. We further showed that such deviations are often closely related with lack of comfort granting associated permissions to an app. Our paper builds on this earlier work by scaling up our crowdsourcing framework and performing more advanced data analysis to allow for the development of finer privacy preference models. Our main contribution here is not only to show how mobile app privacy preferences vary with the purpose of app permission pairs but also in the form of a taxonomy of purposes, which we can later leverage to identify clusters of like-minded users.

2.3 Privacy Preference Learning
A first data mining study of mobile app permissions was presented by Frank et al., where they authors looked for permission request patterns in Android apps [44]. Using matrix factorization techniques, they identified over 30 common patterns of permission requests. Rather than looking for patterns of

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\(^1\) The Android manifest file of each app presents essential information about this app to the Android system, information the system must have before it can run any of the app's code.
permission requests, our work in this area aims to identify patterns in user privacy preferences, namely in the willingness of users to grant permissions to mobile apps for different purposes.

This work more closely aligned with an earlier study published by three of the co-authors, looking at patterns among the Android permission settings of 239,000 LBE Privacy Guard [31] users for around 12,000 apps [12]. In this earlier work, the three co-authors showed that it was possible to define a small number of privacy profiles that collectively captured many of the users’ privacy settings. It further explored mixed initiative models that combine machine learning to predict user permission settings with user prompts when the level of confidence associated with certain predictions appears too low. In contrast to analyzing actual user privacy settings, our work focuses on deeper privacy models, where we elicit people’s privacy preferences in a context where they are not just about the permissions requested by an app but also about the one or more purposes associated with these requests (e.g. to enable the app’s core functionality versus to share data with an advertising network or an analytics company). While our results bear some similarity with those presented in [12], they are significant because: (i) they show that the purpose for which an app requests a certain permission has a major impact on people’s willingness to grant that permission., and (ii) using these more detailed preference models elicited from better-informed users, it is possible to derive a small number of privacy profiles with significant predictive power.

To the best of our knowledge, our work on quantifying mobile app privacy preferences is the first of its kind. It has been influenced by earlier work by several of the co-authors on building somewhat similar models in the context of user location privacy preferences. [45-52]. For example, Lin et al. [45] suggested that people’s location-sharing privacy preferences, though complicated, can still be modeled quantitatively. Early work by Sadeh et al. [52] showed that it was possible to predict people’s location sharing privacy preferences and work by Benisch et al. explored the complexity of people’s location privacy preferences [51]. The work by Ravichandran et al. [46] suggested that providing users with a small number of canonical default policies can help reduce user burden when it comes to customizing the fine-grained privacy settings. The work by Cranshaw et al. [47] applied a classifier based on multivariate Gaussian mixtures to incrementally learn users’ location sharing privacy preferences. Kelley et al. [49] and later Mungan et al. [48] also introduced the notion of understandable learning into privacy research. They used default personas and incremental suggestions to learn users’ location privacy rules, resulting in a significant reduction of user burden. Their results were later evaluated by Wilson et al. [50] in a location sharing user study.

As pointed out by Wilson et al. with regard to location sharing privacy in [50], “... the complexity and diversity of people’s privacy preferences creates a major tension between privacy and usability...” The present mobile app privacy research is motivated by a similar dilemma, which extends well beyond just location. It shows that approaches that worked well in the context of location sharing appear to offer similar promise in the broader context of mobile app privacy preferences, with a methodology enhanced with the use of static analysis to identify the purpose of mobile app permissions.

3. DATA COLLECTION
Before analyzing people’s privacy preferences of mobile apps, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of mobile apps with regard to their privacy-related behaviors as well as the implication of these behaviors. In this section, we provide technical details of how we leveraged static analysis to dissect apps and what we learnt.

3.1 Downloading Android Apps and Their Meta-data
We crawled the Google Play web pages in July 2012 to create an index of all the 171,493 apps that were visible to the US users, among which 108,246 of them were free apps. We obtained the metadata of these apps, including the app name, developer name, ratings, number of downloads, etc. We also downloaded all the binary files of free apps through an open-source Google Play API [3]. Note that Google has strict restrictions on app purchase frequency and limits the number of apps that can be purchased with a single credit card. Because of these restrictions, we opted to only download and analyze free apps in this work. Additional analysis using similar method of our work can be applied to paid apps as well.

3.2 Analyzing Apps’ Privacy-Related Behaviors
We used static analysis tools given that they are more efficient and easier to automate. We chose Androguard [53] as our major static analysis instrument. Androguard is a Python based tool to decompile Android apk files and to facilitate code analysis. We focused our analysis on the top 11 most sensitive and frequently used permission as identified earlier [19]. They are: INTERNET, read_phone_states, ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, CAMERA, GET_ACCOUNTS, SEND_SMS, read_sms, record_audio, BlueTooth and read_contact. We created our own analysis scripts with the Androguard APIs and identified the following information related to apps’ privacy-related behaviors: 1) permission(s) used by each app; 2) The classes and segments of code involved in the use of permissions; 3) All the 3rd-party libraries included in the app; 4) Permissions required by each 3rd-party library. The analysis of 3rd-party libraries provided us more semantic information of how users’ sensitive data were used and to whom they were shared.

We obtained permission information of each app by parsing the manifest file of each apk file. We further scanned the entire decompiled source code and looked for specific Android API calls to determine the classes and functions involved in using these permissions. We identified 3rd-party libraries by looking up package structures in the de-compiled source code. It is possible that we may have missed a few libraries, though we are pretty confident that we were able to correctly identify the vast majority of them and in particular the most popular ones. For the sake of simplicity, we did not distinguish between different versions of the same third party library in our analysis. Similar to the permission analysis step described above, the permission usage of each 3rd-party library was determined by scanning through all the Android standard API calls that relate to the target permission in the de-compiled version of the library’s source code.

We further leveraged five Amazon EC2 M1 Standard Large Linux instances to speed up our analysis of this large quantity of
40% of these apps. SNS libraries achieved an average penetration of 9.8% of the app market, and mobile analytics libraries had an average penetration of 9.8% of the app market.

In addition to these nine categories of sensitive data uses by third parties, we also used “internal use” to label sensitive data usages caused by the application itself rather than a library. It should be noted that, for these internal uses, we currently cannot determine why a certain resource is used (e.g., whether it is “for navigation”, “for setting up a ringtone”, etc.). Based on existing practices, the fact that the API call is within the app’s code rather than in a 3rd party library indicates a high probability that the resource is accessed because it is required by the mobile app itself rather than to collect data on behalf of a third party.

Our static analysis provided a systems-oriented foundation for us to better understand mobile apps in terms of their privacy-related behaviors, which enabled us to study users’ preferences in regard to these app behaviors in the later part of this paper. Note that, although we only collected users’ preferences of 837 apps among the apps we dissected as described in the following subsection, the static analysis of 89,000 + apps was necessary for us to understand the bigger picture of sensitive data uses and to identify the nine categories of 3rd-party libraries.

### 3.3 Crowdsourcing Users’ Mobile App Privacy Preferences

To link users’ privacy preferences to these app behaviors we identified through static analysis, we leveraged Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to collect users’ subjective responses through a study similar what Lin et al. did in [13]. Participants were shown the app’s icon, screen shots, and description of apps. Participants were asked if they expected this app to access certain type of private information and were also asked how comfortable (from “−2” very uncomfortable to “+2” very comfortable) they felt downloading this app given the knowledge that this app accesses their information for the given purposes. Each HIT (Human Intelligence Task) examined one app – permission – purpose triple that we identified as described in the previous section. For example, in one HIT, participants were asked to express their level of comfort in letting Angry Birds (app) access their precise location (permission) for delivering targeted ads (purpose). We added one qualification question in each HIT, asking participants to select from a list of three app categories, to test whether they had read the app’s description and whether they were paying attention to the questions. The template of the HIT is shown in Appendix A.

In total we published 1200 HITs on AMT, probing 837 mobile apps that we randomly sampled from the top 5000 most popular free apps. For each HIT, we aimed to recruit 20 unique

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<th>Table 1. Nine categories of 3rd-party libraries</th>
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<td>Customized UI Components</td>
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<td>Content Host</td>
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<td>Mobile Analytics</td>
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The total analysis required 2035 instance hours, i.e. approximately 1.23 minutes per app. Among all the 108,246 free apps, 89,903 of them were successfully decompiled (83.05%). Upon manual inspection of a few failure examples, we observed that failure to de-compile was primarily attributed to code obfuscation.

In the static analysis, we identified over a thousand 3rd-party libraries used by various apps. We looked up the top 400 3rd-party libraries that are most frequently used in all these apps to understand the purpose or functionality associated with each, based on which we organized these 3rd-party libraries into 9 categories as detailed in Table 1. These categories include Targeted Advertising, Customized UI Components, Content Host, Game Engine, Social Network Sites (SNS), Mobile Analytics, Secondary Market, Payment and other Utilities. We also analyzed how different types of resources (permissions) were used for various purposes. For all the apps we analyzed, we observed an average usage of 1.59 (σ = 2.82, median=1) 3rd-party libraries in each app. There were some extreme cases where an app used more than 30 3rd-party APIs. For example, the app with the package name “com.wikilibs.fan_tattoo_design_for_women” used 31 3rd-party libraries, 22 of which were targeted advertising libraries, such as adwhirl, mdotm, millenialmedia, tapjoy, etc. In the majority of cases (91.7%), apps are bundled with less than or equal to 5 different 3rd-party libraries. The targeted advertising libraries are found in more than 11.2% of the app market, and mobile analytics libraries had an average penetration of 9.8% of the app market.

2 The library uses follows a power-law distribution, therefore, the top 400 most popular libraries covered over 90% of uses.
participants to answer our questions. Participants were paid $0.15 per HIT. We restricted our participants to U.S. smartphone users with previous HIT approval rate higher than 90%.

The study ran for 3 weeks starting on June 15th, 2013. After the data collection period, we first eliminated responses that failed the qualification questions (~7%), and then we eliminated 39 HITs because they had less than 15 responses. This yielded a dataset of 21,657 responses contributed by 725 AMT workers.

4. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS

4.1 Participants

We collected demographic information of our participants including gender, age and education background to help us analyze our data, though we did not specifically control the gender ratio or any other demographic composition of our participants. Among these participants, 41% of them were female; 69% of participants were between 21 and 35, 16% of them are between 36 and 50 (see Table 2). We also observed that more than 60% of the participants were reported to have a bachelor’s degree or equivalent and 6% had a master’s degree or PhD. The average education level of our participants was significantly higher than the average education level of the entire U.S. population as reported in [54]. Compared to the demographics of crowd workers as reported in [55], our participant pool contains more people with bachelor’s degrees and fewer with graduate degrees. This difference in demographics may be caused by self-selection, since usually crowd workers would be more likely to work on HITs that interest them. However, other data collection methods, such as Internet surveys, often have similar sampling problems. While this sample bias has to be taken into account when interpreting our results, we suspect that our study is no worse than most others in terms of the representativeness of our participant pool.

4.2 Users’ Average Preferences and Their Variances

To visualize our results, we aggregated self-reported comfort ratings by permission and purpose. Figure 1(a) shows the average preferences of all 725 participants, where white indicates participants were very comfortable (2.0) with the disclosure, and red indicates very uncomfortable (-2.0). In other words, darker shades of red indicate a higher level of concern. Entries with a short dash indicate the absence of data for a particular permission-purpose.

The three use cases with the highest levels of comfort were: (1) apps using location information for their internal functionality (fine location: µ = 0.90, coarse location: µ = 1.16); (2) SNS libraries bundled in mobile apps using users’ location information so this context information can be used in sharing (fine location: µ = 0.28, coarse location: µ = 0.30); (3) apps accessing smartphone states, including unique phone IDs, and account information for internal functionality (µ = 0.13).

For the remaining cases, users expressed different levels of concerns. Users were generally uneasy with (1) targeted advertising libraries accessing their private information, especially for their contact list (µ = -0.97) and account
information ($\mu = -0.60$); (2) SNS libraries that access their unique
unique phone ID ($\mu = -0.42$), contact list ($\mu = -0.56$), as well as
information related to their communication and web activities such as SMS ($\mu = -0.17$) and accounts ($\mu = -0.23$); and (3) mobile
analytic libraries accessing their location ($\mu = -0.29$) and phone
state ( $\mu = -0.09$).

This aggregation of data gave us a good starting point to spot
general trends in users’ privacy preferences. At the same time,
these are averages and, as such, they do not tell us much about
the diversity of opinions people might have. An important lesson we
learnt from previous literature of location privacy is that users’
privacy preferences are very diverse. To underscore this point, we
plotted the variances of user preferences of the same use cases, as
shown in Figure 1 (b). Here, darker shades of yellow indicate
higher variance among users’ comfort rating for different
purposes.

Figure 1 (b) shows that users’ preferences are definitely not
unified. Variances are larger than 0.6 (of a rating in a [-2, +2]
scale) in all cases. In 25% of cases, variances exceeded 1.8. Users’
disagreements were highest in the following cases, including: (1)
SNS libraries accessing users’ SMS information as well as their
accounts; (2) targeted advertising libraries accessing users’
contact list; (3) users’ location information being accessed by all
kinds of external libraries.

This high variance in users’ privacy preferences suggests that
having a single one-size-fits-all privacy setting for everyone may
not work well — at least for those settings with a high variance.
We cannot simply average the crowdsourced user preferences and
use them as default settings as suggested in [32]. This begs the
question of whether users could possibly be subdivided into a
small number of groups or clusters of like-minded individuals for
which such default settings (different settings in different groups)
could be identified. We discuss this idea in the next section.

5. LEARNING MOBILE APP PRIVACY
PREFERENCES

Given the large variances identified above, a unified default
setting evidently cannot satisfy all the users’ privacy preferences.
Therefore, we chose to investigate methods for segmenting the
entire user population into a number of subgroups that have
similar preferences within the subgroups. Then by identifying the
suitable default settings for each of these groups and the group
each user belongs to, we can suggest individual users with more
accurate default settings.

5.1 Pre-processing

To identify these groups, we need to properly encode each user’s
preferences into a vector and trim the dataset to prevent over-
fitting. More specifically, we conducted three kinds of
preprocessing before feeding the dataset into various clustering
algorithms. First, we eliminated participants who contributed less
than 5 responses to our data set, since it would be difficult to
categorize participants if we know too little about their
preferences. This step yielded a total number of 479 unique
participants with 20,825 responses. On average, each participant
contributed 43.5 responses ($\sigma = 38.2$, Median=52). Second, we
aggregated a participant’s preferences by averaging their
indicated comfort levels of letting apps use specific permissions
for specific purposes. “NA” is used if a participant did not have a
chance to indicate his/her preferences for a given permission-
purpose pair. Lastly, for each missing feature (“NA”), we found the
k ($k=10$) nearest neighbors that had the corresponding feature.
We then imputed the missing value by using the average of
analoging values of their neighbor vectors.

After these preprocessing steps, we obtained a matrix of 77
columns (i.e. with regard to 77 permission-purpose pairs) and 479
rows, where each row of the matrix represented a participant.
Each entry of the matrix was a value between [-2, +2]. This
preference matrix was free of missing values.

5.2 Selection of Algorithms and Models

We opted to use hierarchical clustering with an agglomerative
approach to cluster participants’ mobile app privacy preferences.
In the general case, the time complexity of agglomerative
clustering is O(n³) [56]. Though its time complexity is not as fast
as k-means or other flat clustering algorithms, we chose
hierarchical clustering mainly because its resulting hierarchical
structure is much more informative and more interpretable than
unstructured clustering approaches (such as k-means). More
specifically, we experimented with several distance measures
[56], including Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance [57],
Canberra Distance [58], and Binary distance [59]. We also
experimented with four agglomerative methods, including
Ward’s method [60], Centroid Linkage Method [61], Average
Linkage method [61], and McQuitty’s Similarity method [62].

We limited our exploration to the above-mentioned distance
functions and agglomerative methods, since other distance
functions or agglomerative methods either produce similar results
as the above-mentioned ones or are not appropriate for our tasks
based on the characteristics of our data. As research on clustering
techniques continues, it is possible that new techniques could
provide even better results than the ones we present. We found
however these techniques were already sufficient to isolate very
different categories of mobile apps, when it comes to their
permissions and the purposes associated with these permissions.

To select the best model, we experimented with various ways of
combining the four agglomerative methods and four distance
measures and also varied the number of clusters k from 2 to 20 by
using the R package “hclust” [63]. We conducted all the
experiments on a Linux machine which has XeonE5-2643
3.3GHz CPU (16 cores) and 32G memory. We had two selection
criteria in determining which combination of distance function
and agglomerative method to use. First, the combination should
not generate clusters with extremely skewed structures in
dendrograms. A dendrogram is a tree diagram frequently used to
illustrate the arrangement of the clusters produced by hierarchical
clustering. The tree structure in the dendrogram illustrate how
clusters merged in each iteration. We check this by heuristically
inspecting the dendrograms of each clustering result. The other
criteria is the combination of three internal measures, namely
connectivity [64], Silhouette Width [65] and Dunn Index [66].

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3 GET_ACCOUNTS permission gives apps the ability to discover
existing accounts on managed by Android operating system without
knowing the passwords of these accounts.

4 READ_PHONE_STATE permission gives apps the ability to obtain
unique phone id and detect if the users is currently calling someone.
Compared to the variances in Figure 1, the variance of each figure show the corresponding variances within the cluster. The right grids in each where shades of red indicate discomfort, with darker shades of participants feel comfortable with a given permission-purpose colors to indicate people's preferences. White indicates that the left grids represent the centroid of the cluster. We use two the uses of different permissions, and the horizontal dimension 3 – Figure 6. The vertical dimension of these heat maps represents (colored in red) includes 11.90% instances.  We assigned a name of these names and the interpretation of our clustering results are identified clusters, the largest one (colored in black in Figure 2) of them and forms the second largest cluster in our dataset. This cluster represents 23.34% of all the participants and forms the second largest cluster in our dataset (Figure 4). The heat map of this privacy profile has the largest area covered in light color (indicate of comfort). In general, these participants felt the least comfortable granting sensitive information and functionality to third parties (e.g., location and unique phone ID). They also felt uncomfortable with mobile apps that want to access their unique phone ID, contacts list or SMS functionality, even if for internal purposes only.

The (Privacy) Conservatives: Although conservatives form the smallest group among the four clusters, they still represent 11.90% of our participants (see Figure 3). Compared to the heat maps of other clusters, this cluster (or “privacy profile”) has the largest area covered in red and also the overall darkest shades of red (indicating the lack of comfort granting permissions). In general, these participants felt the least comfortable granting sensitive information and functionality to third parties (e.g., location and unique phone ID). They also felt uncomfortable with mobile apps that want to access their unique phone ID, contacts list or SMS functionality, even if for internal purposes only.

The Unconcerned: This group represents 23.34% of all the participants and forms the second largest cluster in our dataset (Figure 4). The heat map of this privacy profile has the largest area covered in light color (indicate of comfort). In general, participants who share this privacy profile showed a particularly high level of comfort disclosing sensitive personal data under a wide range of conditions, no matter who is collecting their data and for what purpose. The only concerning (red) entry in the heat map is when it comes to granting SNS libraries access to the GET_ACCOUNTS permission (e.g. information connected to accounts such as Google+, Facebook, YouTube). A closer analysis suggests that it might even be an anomaly caused by the lack of sufficient data points for this particular entry. Another possible interpretation might be that a considerable portion of participants did not understand the meaning of this permission and mistakenly thought this permission gives apps ability to know their passwords of all accounts

The Fence-Sitters: We labeled participants in this cluster as "Fence-Sitters" because most of them did not appear to feel strongly one way or the other about many of the use cases (Figure 5). This cluster represents nearly 50% of our population. Unsurprisingly, this group of participants felt quite comfortable letting mobile apps access sensitive personal data for internal functionality purposes. When their information is requested by 3rd-party libraries such as for delivering targeted ads or conducting mobile analytics, their attitude was close to neutral (i.e. neither comfortable nor uncomfortable). This is reflected in the heat map with large portions of it colored in light shades of pink (close to the middle color in the legend). This group of participants also felt consistently comfortable disclosing all types of sensitive personal data to SNS libraries. Further research on why so many participants behave in this way is challenging and necessary. We suspect that this might be related to some level of habituation or warning fatigue, namely they might have gotten used to the idea that this type of information is being accessed by mobile apps and they have not experienced any obvious problem resulting from this practice.

This cluster of participants also reminds us of the privacy pragmatist group identified by Westin in producing privacy

5 Again, in these visualizations, we only display the most important six permissions and four purposes that strongly differentiate participants.

These three internal measures validate the clustering results based on their connectivity, compactness and degree of separation.

5.3 Resulting Clusters

Based on the two criteria described in the previous sub-section, we obtained the best clusters by using Canberra distance and Average Linkage method with k=4.

Figure 2 illustrates the resulting dendrogram produced by the above-mentioned clustering configurations, where four different colors indicate the four clusters when k=4. Among the four identified clusters, the largest one (colored in black in Figure 2) includes 47.81% of instances, whereas the smallest cluster (colored in red) includes 11.90% instances. We assigned a name to each cluster based on its outstanding characteristics and overlaid these names on the dendrogram as well. The explanation of these names and the interpretation of our clustering results are discussed in the following section.

6. RESULT INTERPRETATION

To make sense of what these clusters mean, we computed the centroid of each cluster by averaging the feature vectors of instances within the cluster. Note that we computed the centroid of each cluster based on the non-imputed data points, i.e. only averaging the entries when there were true values, since they better estimate the true average preferences of users in each category.

6.1 Making Sense of User Clusters

We used a heat map to visualize these clusters$^5$ as shown in Figure 3 – Figure 6. The vertical dimension of these heat maps represents the uses of different permissions, and the horizontal dimension represents why a certain permission is requested. In each figure, the left grids represent the centroid of the cluster. We use two colors to indicate people’s preferences. White indicates that participants feel comfortable with a given permission-purposed whereas shades of red indicate discomfort, with darker shades of red corresponding to greater discomfort. The right grids in each figure show the corresponding variances within the cluster. Compared to the variances in Figure 1, the variance of each clusters are significantly smaller. Some of them are almost negligible.

We have labeled each cluster with a name that attempts to highlight its distinguishing characteristics. The labels are (privacy) “conservatives”, “unconcerned”, “fence-sitters”, and “advanced users”.

The (Privacy) Conservatives: Although conservatives form the smallest group among the four clusters, they still represent 11.90% of our participants (see Figure 3). Compared to the heat maps of other clusters, this cluster (or “privacy profile”) has the largest area covered in red and also the overall darkest shades of red (indicating the lack of comfort granting permissions). In general, these participants felt the least comfortable granting sensitive information and functionality to third parties (e.g., location and unique phone ID). They also felt uncomfortable with mobile apps that want to access their unique phone ID, contacts list or SMS functionality, even if for internal purposes only.

The Unconcerned: This group represents 23.34% of all the participants and forms the second largest cluster in our dataset (Figure 4). The heat map of this privacy profile has the largest area covered in light color (indicate of comfort). In general, participants who share this privacy profile showed a particularly high level of comfort disclosing sensitive personal data under a wide range of conditions, no matter who is collecting their data and for what purpose. The only concerning (red) entry in the heat map is when it comes to granting SNS libraries access to the GET_ACCOUNTS permission (e.g. information connected to accounts such as Google+, Facebook, YouTube). A closer analysis suggests that it might even be an anomaly caused by the lack of sufficient data points for this particular entry. Another possible interpretation might be that a considerable portion of participants did not understand the meaning of this permission and mistakenly thought this permission gives apps ability to know their passwords of all accounts

The Fence-Sitters: We labeled participants in this cluster as "Fence-Sitters" because most of them did not appear to feel strongly one way or the other about many of the use cases (Figure 5). This cluster represents nearly 50% of our population. Unsurprisingly, this group of participants felt quite comfortable letting mobile apps access sensitive personal data for internal functionality purposes. When their information is requested by 3rd-party libraries such as for delivering targeted ads or conducting mobile analytics, their attitude was close to neutral (i.e. neither comfortable nor uncomfortable). This is reflected in the heat map with large portions of it colored in light shades of pink (close to the middle color in the legend). This group of participants also felt consistently comfortable disclosing all types of sensitive personal data to SNS libraries. Further research on why so many participants behave in this way is challenging and necessary. We suspect that this might be related to some level of habituation or warning fatigue, namely they might have gotten used to the idea that this type of information is being accessed by mobile apps and they have not experienced any obvious problem resulting from this practice.

This cluster of participants also reminds us of the privacy pragmatist group identified by Westin in producing privacy

Figure 2. The resulting dendrogram produced by hierarchical clustering with Canberra distance and average linkage agglomerative method. Four different colors are used to indicate the cluster composition when k=4. We also overlay the cluster names on the dendrogram which will be explained in Section 6.1.
Westin found that while small numbers of users would fall at both extremes of the spectrum (i.e. privacy fundamentalist, and unconcerned), the majority of users tend to be in-between (pragmatists). An interesting finding of our analysis is that the preferences of these middle-of-the-road users can generally be captured with just two profiles, namely the “fence-sitters” and the “advanced users” (see next subsection).

The Advanced Users: The advanced user group represents 17.95% of the population (see Figure 6). This group of participants felt neutral to ads and mobile analytics. This group also had the largest within-cluster variances.

Figure 6. The centroid (left) and variances (right) of advanced users. This group of users were more selective in their privacy preferences.

suggests that this group of users have better insight when it comes to assigning privacy risks to different usage scenarios.

6.2 Estimating the Predictive Power of the Clusters

As discussed above, the clusters we have identified give rise to significant drops in variance. Could these or somewhat similar clusters possibly help predict many of the permission settings a user would otherwise have to manually configure? Providing a definite answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, in part because our data captures preferences (or comfort levels) rather than actual settings and in part also because answering such a question would ultimately require packaging this functionality in the form of an actual UI and evaluating actual use of the resulting functionality. Below we limit ourselves to an initial analysis, which suggests that the clusters we have identified have promising predictive power and that similar clusters could likely be developed to actually predict many permission settings – for instance in the form of recommendations.
reductions in user burden. We assumed that all testing participants of participants to compute cluster centroids and generate privacy identical sizes. We then used each possible combination of 9 folds We randomly split all the participants into 10 folds of (almost) predictive power and potential reductions in user burden. summarized below show promise both in terms of potential is not equivalent to one based on actual settings and that the While we acknowledge that an analysis under these assumptions them as proxies for actual settings users would want to have.

We now turn to our estimation of the potential benefits that could be derived from using clusters and privacy profiles to help users configure nearly 87% of the triples if one were to rely on a single one-size-fits-all grand profile. For users in the “advanced” and “conservative” categories, user burden drops below 20%. All numbers were averaged over 10 runs using different partitions of training and testing data and were weighted by the usages of all permission-purpose pairs among the 837 apps.

Figure 7. Compared to using a single one-size-fits-all grand average profile to all participants, classifying participants into four profiles can significantly increase the accuracy in predicting if the system should grant, deny or prompt users for a specific app-permission-purpose triple (55.82% vs. 79.37%). For two profiles (“unconcerned” and “conservatives”) the prediction accuracies are higher than 85%. All numbers were averaged over 10 runs with different partitions of training and testing data.

Specifically, as part of our analysis, we transformed the four cluster centroids into four “privacy profiles” (i.e. sets of recommendations) by quantizing the [-2, 2] comfort rating into three options, namely “Accept” (average comfort rating higher than or equal to 0.67), “Reject” (average comfort rating lower than or equal to -0.67), and “Prompt” (average comfort rating between -0.67 and +0.67 exclusively). In other words, in our analysis, we assumed that “Accept” meant the corresponding purpose-permission pair would be automatically granted. Similarly a “Reject” value is interpreted as automatically denying the corresponding permission-purpose pair. Cases with values falling in between are simply assumed to result in a user prompt, namely asking the user to decide whether to grant or deny the corresponding permission-purpose pair. In short, under these assumptions, a user would be assigned a profile, which in turn would be used to automatically configure those permission-purpose settings for which the profile has an “Accept” or “Reject” entry, with the remaining settings having to be manually configured by each individual user.

We randomly split all the participants into 10 folds of (almost) identical sizes. We then used each possible combination of 9 folds of participants to compute cluster centroids and generate privacy profiles (in terms of “Accept”, “Deny”, and “Prompt” for each permission-purpose pair). The remaining fold of participants was used to evaluate the benefits of the learned profiles – both in terms of expected increase in accuracy and in terms of expected reductions in user burden. We assumed that all testing participants were able to choose a privacy profiles that closely captured their preferences (which will be discussed in Subsection 6.3-6.4). We averaged the following two metrics across all 10 runs:

1. **Accuracy**: the percentage of time that the selected privacy profile agreed with the comfort rating provided by each individual participants in the testing group for each of the app-permission-purpose triples available in the data set for that user. (Figure 7).

2. **User burden**: the percentage of time the participants in testing sets would be prompted to specify their decisions, weighted by the usages of all permission-purpose pairs among all apps (Figure 8). These usages were measured by calculating the percentage of apps in crowdsourcing study (837 in total) that use a specific permission for a specific purpose.

To evaluate the benefits of the profiles, we compare both of these metrics, as obtained using our profiles, with identical metrics obtained using a single one-size-fits-all grand profile for all users (as shown in Fig. 1 (a)). This is referred to as “Grand average profile”.

As can be seen in Figure 7, the profiles result in an overall accuracy of nearly 80% (79.37%). In comparison predictions based on a single one-size-fits-all model result in an accuracy of merely 56%, which is not much better than simply prompting users all the time. In particular, using our four profiles, accuracies for people falling in the “unconcerned” and “conservative” groups are higher than 85%.

Figure 8 shows how under our assumptions applying privacy profiles as default settings could significantly reduce user burden. In particular, when using a single- one-size-fits-all model, users would on average have to be prompted for nearly 87% of all their app-permission-purpose triples. In contrast, when using the four privacy profiles, the number of prompts drops to 36.5% of the user’s total number of app-permission-purpose triples. This clearly represents a significant reduction in user burden. For users falling in the “advanced” and “conservative” categories the number of prompts drops below 20%. While we acknowledge that further research is required, using actual permission settings
rather than measures of comfort levels, we believe that the results of our analysis show great promise and warrant further work in this area.

### 6.3 Do Demographics Matter?

Now we want to see how to assign users to the privacy profiles that most closely capture their privacy preferences. Here we first look at whether users’ demographic information – including gender, age and education level – is sufficient to determine which privacy profile a user should be assigned. This included looking at the distribution of gender, age and education level in each user cluster and also looking at variance (ANOVA) to see if there are significant differences in these distributions.

In general, we found that in regard to the gender distribution, a one-way analysis of variance yield NO significant differences between groups, $F(3, 475)=2.049, p=0.106$. For age distribution, we encoded the age groups as (1:= under 21, 2:= age 21-35, 3:=age 35-50, 4:=age 51-65, 5:=above 65) in our calculation. A one-way analysis of variance reveals significant differences between groups in regard to age distribution, $F(3, 475)=4.598, p=0.003$. Post hoc analyses also reveal that the uncorcerned group on average are younger ($\mu = 1.69, \sigma = 0.57$) than other groups combined ($\mu = 1.91, \sigma = 0.76$), and the advanced user group on average are older ($\mu = 2.05, \sigma = 0.61$) than other groups combined ($\mu = 1.83, \sigma = 0.71$).

We also performed a similar test on the education level of all four groups of participants. We encoded the education levels such that “1” stands for high school or lower level of education, “2” stands for bachelor or equivalent level of degrees, and “3” stands for master’s or higher level of degrees. An ANOVA test shows that the effect of education level was strongly significant, $F(3, 475)=7.52, p=6.3E-05$. Post hoc analyses show that the conservatives ($\mu = 1.65, \sigma = 0.48$) and the uncorcerned ($\mu = 1.67, \sigma = 0.54$) have lower education levels compared to the remaining groups combined ($\mu = 1.85, \sigma = 0.57$), and the advanced users ($\mu = 2.01, \sigma = 0.60$) are more likely to have a higher level of education.

Although there are statistically significant effects in demographics, a regression from demographic information to the cluster label yields accuracy no better than directly putting every user as Fence-Sitters. In other words, we should not directly use gender, age, or education level to infer which privacy profile should be applied to individual user. This does not mean however that in combination with other factors, these attributes would not be useful. Below, we seek more deterministic methods to assign privacy profiles in the following sub-section.

### 6.4 Possible Ways to Assign Privacy Profiles

We start with a typical scenario where a privacy profile can be assigned to a user. When a user boots up her Android device for the first time (or possibly at a later time), the operating system could walk her through a “wizard” and determine which privacy profile is the best match for her. The profile could then be used to select default privacy settings for this user. As the user downloads apps on the smartphone, “App Ops” or some equivalent functionality would then be able to automatically infer good default settings for the user. The major challenge here is how we can accurately determine which cluster this user belongs to without any previous data about this user.

One possible way is to ask users to label a set of mobile apps. We could present users with a small set of example apps together with detailed descriptions such as the sensitive data collected by these apps and for what purposes. Users could rate each app based on its sensitive data usages. We could then classify users based on these ratings. This would work well if we could identify a small number of particularly popular apps that can differentiate between users - say just asking people whether they feel comfortable sharing their location with Angry Birds game for advertising purpose and whether they feel comfortable posting their location on Facebook through the Scope app. Further research on selecting the most effective set of apps would make this process more effective and stable.

Alternatively, we might probe users’ privacy preferences by asking them a small set of general questions. Similar ideas have been suggested for helping users set up their location sharing rules [46] [48]. In particular Wilson et al. in [50] described a simple wizard for the Locaccino system, where a small number of questions were asked to guide users through the selection of good default location sharing profiles. A similar method could be used to identify a small number of questions to help determine appropriate mobile app privacy profiles for individual users.

Given the four privacy profiles that we identified, we note several observations that could be used to differentiate between different groups of users. For example, the reported comfort ratings with respect to sharing data with advertising agencies can be used to separate the uncorcerned group from the privacy conservatives and the advanced users; we could use people’s preferences with regard to sharing coarse location information for mobile analytics to further differentiate between the latter two groups; or we can isolate the privacy conservatives based on their extreme negative comfort rating with SNS libraries. One should be able to identify a small number of questions based on these or similar observations. The ideal scenario would be that, based on their answers to these questions, users could be accurately assigned to the most appropriate cluster. For example, we can ask one question with regard to targeted advertising, such as “How do you feel letting mobile apps access your personal data for delivering targeted ads?” or questions about mobile analytics, such as “How do you feel about letting mobile apps share your approximate location with analytics companies?” The exact wording and expressions used in these questions would obviously need to be refined based on user studies.

The privacy profiles we extracted are a good estimation but might not perfectly match individual user preferences. It is necessary to clarify that applying privacy profiles does not prevent users from further personalizing their privacy decisions. In addition to choosing an appropriate privacy profile as a starting point, users could be provided with user-oriented machine learning functionality or just interactive functionality that helps them iteratively refine their settings [47-49].

### 7. DISCUSSION

#### 7.1 Limitations of This Work

This work has several limitations. For example, our study focused solely on free apps downloaded from the Google Play. Apps that require purchase might exhibit slightly different privacy-related behaviors with regard to what sensitive resources to request and for what purpose. There are two major challenges that prevented us to investigate paid apps: (a) the monetary cost of purchasing a large number of paid apps would be substantial (we estimate over $80K to get all the paid apps); (b) there is no way to programmatically do batch purchasing on Google Play, since
Google limits the frequency of app purchases using a single credit card in a single day. It should also be noted that free apps represent the majority of app downloads, and paid apps tend to request fewer permissions — in other words, they give rise to a somewhat smaller number of privacy decisions. This being said, there is no reason to believe that the models derived for free apps could not be extended to paid apps — while people’s privacy preferences might be different, there is no reason to believe that similar clusters could not be identified.

In determining why certain sensitive resources are requested, our study used a relatively coarse classification. Our static analysis cannot give finer-grained explanations, such as requesting location for navigation vs. requesting location for nearby search. We acknowledge that our approach is not perfect. However, comparing to a finer analysis relying on manual inspection, using libraries to infer the purpose of permissions enables us to conduct our analysis at large scale. Additional techniques could possibly be developed over time to further increase accuracy. For example, the tool described by Amini et al. [26] that combines crowdsourcing and dynamic analysis might be able to provide this level of details, through it has not been publicly available yet.

Among all the four clusters we identified, the Fence-Sitter cluster has a relatively high variance. By using more advanced clustering techniques better clusters could likely be generated with even smaller intra-cluster variances. However, we consider the primary contribution of this work is to demonstrate the feasibility of profile-based privacy settings. As part of future work, we hope to extend our data collection and experiments, such that we can further refine our clusters and possibly obtain even better results.

7.2 Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Users’ mobile app privacy preferences are not unified. This paper quantitatively proved that mobile app users have diverse privacy preferences. This suggested that simply crowdsourcing people’s average preferences as suggested by Agarwal and Hall in the PMP privacy settings [32] might not be optimal. In spite of the diversity, we also show that there are a relatively small number of groups of like-minded users that share many common preferences. Using these identified groups, we derived mobile app privacy preferences profiles, find for each user a profile that is a close match, and use this information to automate the privacy setting process.

Purpose is more important. Previous work in mobile app analysis as well as on users’ privacy concerns focused more on identifying the what sensitive information is accessed by apps [17, 42] as well as how often sensitive information is shared with external entities [43]. Lin et al. [13] pointed out the purpose of why sensitive resources are used is important for users to make privacy decision, though they did not quantitative backup this statement. Our work provides crucial evidence to support this statement. The clusters we identified in our participants are more differentiated in the dimension of why these resources are accessed. This finding also provides important implications to privacy interface design in the sense that properly informing users the purposes of information disclosures are at least as important as informing them what information is disclosed. Unfortunately, the current privacy interfaces, such as the Google Play’s permission list, fall short in making good explanation of the purposes. We strongly suggest mobile app market owners to consider notifying this important information to their customers.

Make use of the naturally crowdsourced data. In our study, we use Amazon Mechanical Turk as the major platform to collect users’ privacy preferences. In reality, given the availability of “App Ops” in Android 4.3, “ProtectMyPrivacy” on jailbroken iPhone, or other similar extensions in rooted Android devices, the operating system or the third-party privacy managers could naturally crowdsource users’ privacy preferences without extra effort. These valuable datasets also presumably have better user coverage and are more representative than what we can collect with the limited resources we have. A significant portion of the methodologies discussed in this work can be directly applied to these dataset to build models of mobile users in the wild. We encourage industry to make fully uses of the findings we present in this paper to make real impact in providing users with better privacy controls.

In short, the findings that we present provide important lessons about mobile app users, and also point out a way to make privacy settings potentially usable to end users. However, there is still much work that needs to be done to model users’ privacy preferences. We are also aware that users’ privacy preferences might keep on evolving and are influenced by the introduction of new technologies and the habituation effect that formed through interacting with the same practices for a long time. Therefore, in addition to all the techniques we proposed, we believe other prospects such as proper user education, improving and enforcing laws and regulations are also crucial and need to be promoted in the long run.

8. CONCLUSION

This paper complements existing mobile app privacy research by quantitatively linking apps’ privacy related behaviors to users’ privacy preferences. We utilized the static analysis with specific focus on how and why 3rd-party libraries use different sensitive resources and leveraged crowdsourcing to collect privacy preferences of over 700 participants with regard to over 800 apps. Based on the collected data, we identified four distinct privacy profiles, providing reasonable default settings to help users configure their privacy settings. Initial results intended to estimate the benefits of these profiles suggest that they could probably be used to significantly alleviate user burden, by helping predict many of a user’s mobile app privacy preferences. Under our proposed approach, users would still be prompted when the variance of the predictions associated with an entry in a given profile exceeds a certain threshold. More sophisticated learning techniques could possibly further boost the accuracy of such predictions.

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10. REFERENCES


APPENDIX A.

Template of Amazon Mechanical Turk Task
Please read the description carefully and answer the questions below. HIT will be rejected if you just click through.

[app name][app icon]

Developer: [developer name]
Average rating: [rating] / 5.0
Rating count: [count]
Description: [description text copied from Google Play]
[App Screenshot from Google Play #1]
[App Screenshot from Google Play #2]
[App Screenshot from Google Play #3]
You must ACCEPT the HIT before you can answer questions.

Have you used this app before? (Required)
a. Yes
b. No

What category do you think this mobile app belongs to? (Required)
a. [Candidate category #1]
b. [Candidate category #2]
c. [Candidate category #3]

Suppose you have installed [app name] on your Android device, would you expect it to access your [describing permission in plain English]? (Required)
a. Yes
b. No

Based on our analysis, [app name] accesses user's [describing permission in plain English] for [explaining purpose]. Assuming you need an app with similar function, would you feel comfortable downloading this app and using it on your phone? (Required)
a. Most comfortable
b. Somewhat comfortable
c. Somewhat uncomfortable
d. Very uncomfortable

Please provide any comments you may have below, we appreciate your input!
[text box]